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A King’s Word: Pre-1949 Chinese Bonds and a
Framework for Pursuing Claims on “Classically”
Time-Barred Bonds
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“O kingis word shuld be o kingis bonde[.]” 1
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I. Introduction
As President Donald Trump’s campaign against Chinese trade
practices gained momentum in 2018, 2 multiple news outlets
2 On March 31, 2017, President Donald Trump signed executive orders calling for
stricter trade policy enforcement and for a comprehensive review of trade deficits. See
Remarks on Signing Executive Orders on Trade, 2017, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 213 (Mar.
31, 2017); see also Exec. Order No. 13,785, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,719 (Apr. 5, 2017); Exec.
Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,721 (Apr. 5, 2017) (“Free and fair trade is critical to
the Nation’s prosperity, national security, and foreign policy. It is in America’s economic
and national security interests to promote commerce by strengthening our relationships
with our trading partners, vigorously enforcing our Nation’s trade laws, improving the
overall conditions for competition and trade, and ensuring the strength of our
manufacturing and defense industrial bases . . . . The United States must address the
challenges to economic growth and employment that may arise from large and chronic
trade deficits and the unfair and discriminatory trade practices of some of our trading
partners.”). This was followed by the imposition of tariffs against Chinese imports, a probe
into alleged Chinese intellectual property theft, and an examination of imports and trade
practices that could impair the national security of the United States. Statement on
Proposed Additional Tariffs Against China, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 221 (Apr. 5,
2018); Memorandum on Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions
Related to Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Technology, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 572 (Aug. 14, 2017). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF INDUST. & SEC.,
OFF. OF TECH. EVALUATION, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL
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reported a curious story. The plot: a group of American citizens
petitioned President Donald Trump to press claims against the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) dating as far back as the
Imperial Qing Dynasty. 3 The citizens are holders of unpaid bonds
issued by China before 1949, the year the PRC was formally
proclaimed by Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao
Zedong. 4 These bondholders argue that the PRC, as the legal
successor to the governments that issued the bonds, must satisfy the
defaulted bonds. 5 The bondholders met with President Trump in
person, and reportedly “he and his financial and economic advisors
were almost universally in support of pursuing payment from China,
or using it to claim an offset against the U.S. debt obligations to
China.” 6 By their estimate, $750 billion of these bonds are held by
Americans. 7 With China holding over $1 trillion of the United
States’ debt, 8 could reviving the pre-1949 debt claims be a valid
offset, or serve as leverage in negotiations with China? 9
SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION
ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED (2018), https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/steel/
2224-the-effect-of-imports-of-steel-on-the-national-security-with-redactions20180111/file [https://perma.cc/37P6-W28T].
3 See Tracy Alloway, Trump’s New Trade War Tool Might Just Be Antique China
Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-08-29/trump-s-new-trade-war-weapon-might-just-be-antique-china-debt
[https://perma.cc/LHZ7-GHS7].
4 See China Owes America over $1 Trillion in Sovereign Debt, AM. BONDHOLDERS
FOUND., http://americanbondholdersfoundation.com/ [https://perma.cc/55P5-YGL3] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2020) [hereinafter China Owes America].
5 A Timeless Argument: American Creditors Say China Should Honour PreCommunist Debts, ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-andeconomics/2018/09/27/american-creditors-say-china-should-honour-pre-communistdebts [https://perma.cc/TE7Q-577E] [hereinafter China Should Honour Pre-Communist
Debts].
6 Steve Gill, Steve Gill Commentary: Is a Tennessee Foundation a Key to Resolving
Debt and Trade Issues with China?, TENN. STAR (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://tennesseestar.com/2018/11/27/steve-gill-commentary-is-a-tennessee-foundationa-key-to-resolving-debt-and-trade-issues-with-china/ [https://perma.cc/2JH6-QPV8].
7 See China Should Honour Pre-Communist Debts, supra note 5; China Owes
America, supra note 4.
8 Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities (in Billions of Dollars), U.S. DEP’T
OF TREASURY, https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt [https://perma.cc/S6QVEZHV] (last updated Dec. 15, 2020); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., FOREIGN PORTFOLIO
HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF JUNE 28, 2019, 13 ex. 6, 30 ex. 14 (2020),
https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/shl2019r.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9M5-HY7Z].
9 The holders of the Chinese debt are private parties and not the federal government;
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Finding a Rembrandt at a flea market is a bewitching dream not
easily dispelled. 10
Although the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) has sought to enjoin the offering and selling
of bonds to vulnerable individuals, 11 as explained in Part I of this
article, the bondholders have a prima facie case for recovery. 12
Imperial and Republican China incurred valid debt for legitimate
however, at minimum, the federal government would benefit from tax revenues of any
proceeds recovered by the bondholders. See, e.g., Jonathan Garber, $1.6T in Century-Old
Chinese Bonds Offer Trump Unique Leverage Against Beijing, FOX BUS. (May 14, 2020),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/historic-chinese-bonds-trump-leverage-beijing
[https://perma.cc/E65D-5SZK]. The possibility that the federal government could
legitimize a claim of that magnitude might also provide leverage in other bilateral matters
with China. Id.
10 See REGINALD SCOT, THE DISCOVERIE OF WITCHCRAFT 147 (Brinsley Nicholson
ed., Elliot Stock 1886) (1584) (“How manie have beene bewitched with dreames, and
thereby made to consume themselves with digging and searching for monie & c: whereof
they, or some other, have drempt? I my selfe could manifest as having knowne how wise
men have beene that waie abused by verie simple persons, even where no dreame hath
been met withall, but waking dreames.”).
11 See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Caldwell, No. 5:18-cv-00434 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2018)
(alleging that the pastor of one of the largest Protestant churches in the country defrauded
elderly investors by selling them pre-Revolutionary Chinese Bonds that were “mere
collectible memorabilia with no meaningful investment value”); Complaint at 4-5, SEC v.
Harper, No. 5:18-cv-00436 (W.D. La. Mar. 29, 2018) (explaining that the “bonds have
been in default since 1939 and the current Chinese government refuses to recognize the
debt” and that the defendants misrepresented the bonds as, inter alia, “‘risk free’” and
omitted facts indicating that the bonds are in default and no liquid market exists). Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Prominent Pastor, Financial Planner
in Scheme to Defraud Elderly Investors (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-51 [https://perma.cc/7TX2-LA6M].
12 Professor Mark Weidemaier of the University of North Carolina School of Law
and Professor Mitu Gulati of Duke University School of Law argue that “at least in theory,
the holder of one of these instruments could sue the current Chinese government for nonpayment.” Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Pre-Revolutionary Chinese Debt: An
Investment for the Truly Stable Genius, CREDIT SLIPS (July 21, 2019),
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/07/pre-revolutionary-chinese-debt-aninvestment-for-the-truly-stable-genius.html [https://perma.cc/J6F3-5CCJ]. They hasten to
clarify that certain avenues of using these old bonds to offset current debt owed to the PRC
are impossible at worst, incredibly unlikely at best, and the only realistic path “is for the
U.S. government to intervene politically [by] try[ing] to pressure the PRC to pay some
kind of compensation.” Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese
Debt Already, CREDIT SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019) https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/
2019/09/enough-with-the-old-chinese-debt-already.html [https://perma.cc/RSJ7-XQ55]
[hereinafter Weidemaier & Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese Debt Already]
(discussing the theory that bondholders might assign their claims to the United States,
which, under 28 U.S.C. § 2415, could use these otherwise time-barred claims to reduce
U.S. debt against China if China tried to enforce its own claims against the United States).
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governmental purposes. 13 As their successor government, the PRC
is liable for that debt, and 14 as of the writing of this article, the PRC
has not paid the debt. 15 Part II reveals that U.S. federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims against the PRC because a foreign
sovereign is not immune from suits involving commercial activities
such as raising capital. 16 However, many prospective plaintiffs may
be turned away if the “direct effects” in the United States are too
remote. 17 As set out in Part III, those plaintiffs that survive the
“direct effects” bar are likely to prevail against the defenses that the
PRC is not the successor to the debt and that the debt is so odious
as to be unenforceable. 18
Another hurdle that may be
insurmountable to many plaintiffs is the statute of limitations: the
time to enforce claims for non-payment of interest and principal has
passed. 19 The argument that the statute of limitations has been tolled
by lack of an adequate forum is not likely to prevail. 20 Plaintiffs
whose bonds have a perpetual pari passu clause have a glimmer of
hope, but this can easily be extinguished by a court interested in
quieting matters. In short, the time for digging for treasure seems
to have passed. 21
II. The Bondholders’ Prima Facie Case
A. Imperial and Republican Chinese Bond Issuances
The history of China from the late 19th century to the fall of the
Republic of China on the mainland is reflected in its bond

13 See PAUL E. ECKEL, THE FAR EAST SINCE 1500, 272–80 (Harcourt, Brace & Co.
1947). Most of the bonds issued during this period either funded the First Sino-Japanese
War, funded reparation afterward owed to Japan, or funded the construction of railroads.
See id. at 194, 273, 465–66.
14 See infra Section III.A.
15 See infra Section II.B.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Section III.B.3.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Section IV.C.1.
20 See infra Section IV.C.2.
21 SCOT, supra note 10, at 147 (“And if the time of digging be neglected, the devil
will carry all the treasure away.”). The inter-governmental aspects of the claims are a
separate but intertwined matter. As mentioned, there is a U.S. statute—28 U.S.C. § 2415—
that allows the United States to bring stale counterclaims against its creditors. See
Weidemaier & Gulati, Enough with Old Chinese Debt Already, supra note 12.
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issuances. 22 Broadly, the bonds provided capital to fund the
construction and operation of telegraphs, railways, roads and other
projects essential to the economic development of China. 23 These
bonds also funded war efforts, and, when unsuccessful, indemnity
payments to the victors. 24 China’s debt resulted in an unsustainably
high debt service burden, reflecting either fair risk premiums for a
turbulent emerging economy, exploitative rates coerced by power
imbalances, or a combination of both, depending on one’s
perspective. 25
Qing Era Bonds
By the late 19th century, China had been under the rule of the
Qing dynasty for over two centuries. 26 European interest in China
rose at the end of the 18th century, when European countries grew
into maritime trading powers and European consumers sought
Chinese goods. 27 European silver flowed to China to pay for the
goods, which resulted in trade imbalances and the depletion of
European silver reserves. 28 The British, seeking to stem this silver
hemorrhage, took advantage of the popularity of opium in China:
Britain began growing opium in British-controlled India and selling
it to China. 29 China and Britain went to war in the First Opium War

22 For a longer survey of older Chinese bonds, see generally, 1 TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA, 1894-1919: MANCHU PERIOD (1894-1911)
(John V. A. MacMurray ed., 1921) [hereinafter TREATIES 1] (containing a variety of bond
treaties made by China between 1894 and 1911); and 2 TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH
AND CONCERNING CHINA, 1894-1919: REPUBLICAN PERIOD (1912-1919) (John V. A.
MacMurray ed., 1921) [hereinafter TREATIES 2] (containing a variety of bond treaties made
by China between 1912 and 1919).
23 See ECKEL, supra note 13, at 279.
24 See TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 110; ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80, 465–66.
25 See, e.g., ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80, 465–66.
26 See generally 1 FREDERIC E. WAKEMAN, THE GREAT ENTERPRISE: THE MANCHU
RECONSTRUCTION OF IMPERIAL ORDER IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY CHINA (1985).
27 See id at 11–24, 34–45, 54–59; Anthony Reid, Preface to SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE
EARLY MODERN ERA: TRADE, POWER, AND BELIEF, at xxiii–xxviii (Anthony J. Reid ed.,
1993).
28 China accepted silver as currency. See WAKEMAN, supra note 26, at 144.
29 PETER W. FAY, THE OPIUM WAR, 1840-1842, 73, 180–81, 185–89 (1997). The
Chinese paid for the opium in silver: consequently, silver flowed out of Britain to China
to buy Chinese goods, but out of China back to Britain in exchange for opium, evening
Britain’s silver levels. See id. at 180–81, 185–89.
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after China sought to end the opium trade. 30 The war ended in
British victory and the signing of the first “unequal treaty” between
China and a Westernized power. 31 The subsequent series of treaties
required China to give territory to Western powers for trading ports;
pay financial reparations; and eliminate any Chinese-owned
monopolies in favor of either free trade or European monopolies. 32
This new domination of China by European powers weakened
the Qing government, and allowed rebellions to foment, including
the catastrophic Taiping Rebellion, the Boxer Rebellion, and the
Second Opium War. 33 The Qing dynasty attempted to reform, as
well as pay off its reparations and war debt, during this late period. 34
This is the backdrop to bonds such as the ‘4½% Gold Loan of 1898’,
which were issued to pay Chinese reparations to Japan following
the First Sino-Japanese War. 35 The 1898 4½% Gold Loan has a 45
year maturity, with interest paid monthly at 4.5% per year. 36 The
coupons are redeemable at either the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation office in London, or the Deutsch-Asiatische
Bank in Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt-am-Maine, and Cologne. 37
See id. at 196–210.
See DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY
1–2 (2005).
32 This is how Hong Kong became a British territory. See id.
33 The Taiping Rebellion alone resulted in an estimated 30 million deaths. See
STEPHEN R. PLATT, AUTUMN IN THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM: CHINA, THE WEST, AND THE EPIC
STORY OF THE TAIPING CIVIL WAR (2012).
34 See ECKEL, supra note 13, at 272–80.
35 See Bond. No. 1898/3, Ger. (Deutsch-Asiatische Bank)-Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corp.)-China, art. 9, Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government
4½% Gold Loan of 1898 (Mar. 1, 1898), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 110
(“The Chinese Imperial Government hereby undertakes to pay the entire balance of the
Indemnity due on the eighth day of May next to the Imperial Japanese Government out of
the proceeds of this loan.”); Charles Denby, The National Debt of China—Its Origin and
Its Security, 68 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55, 58 (1916).
36 See Bond No. 1989/3, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 107–11 (describing the terms
of the bond).
37 E.g., Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, Chinese Imperial Government 4½% Gold Loan
of 1898 1 (Mar. 1, 1898) (bond contract) (on file with note author) [hereinafter 4½% Gold
Loan of 1898]. The Deutsche-Asiatische Bank was founded in Shanghai by Deutsche
Bank and twelve other German banks in 1889 to take advantage of Germany’s large excess
capital from both “a war indemnity of 5 billion francs from France” after the FrancoPrussian War and from rapid domestic industrial growth, and to finance “Chinese imperial
loans and industries, especially mines and railways in the German concessions of China”
such as Tsingtao, Hankou, and Tianjin. ZHAOJIN JI, A HISTORY OF MODERN SHANGHAI
30
31

396

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

These bonds are secured by revenues from general lekins and salt
lekins from seven different provinces (lekin or likin is a “Chinese
provincial tax at inland stations on imports or articles in transit”).38
As evidence of the “unequal treaties,” these revenues were collected
by the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs service, which was
primarily operated by foreigners. 39 Lastly, this bond had “priority,
both as regards principal and interest, over all future loans, charges
or mortgages, so long as this loan or any part thereof shall be
unredeemed.” 40
Similar bonds are the ‘7% Silver Loan of 1894’ and ‘6%
Sterling Loan of 1895’, 41 also taken out to fund the war effort in the
First Sino-Japanese War. 42 The Silver Loan was paid through the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (the modern bank
“HSBC”) by having the Imperial Government issue ‘Customs

BANKING: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 50 (2003). Bank
lending turned to focus on trade finance, which meant the bank suffered during the First
World War as trade between Europe and Asia declined. Ghassan Moazzin, From
Globalization to Liquidation: The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the First World War in
China, 16 CROSS-CURRENTS: E. ASIAN HIST. & CULTURAL REV. 52, 54 (2015). When
China joined the war effort on the side of the Allies against Germany and the Central
Powers, Britain convinced China to liquidate the bank both as part of the war effort against
Germany, and to cripple Germany’s growing threat to Britain’s future global economic
dominance by ensuring “that the bank would be unable to resume business after the war.”
Id. at 58. All German businesses in China held their deposits at the Bank, and this blow
to the Bank affected all German industry in China. Id. at 68. The Bank never fully
recovered, and was quietly absorbed by Deutsche Bank in 1987. Id. at 67; see also
Deutsche Bank in East Asia, WAYBACK MACH.: INTERNET ARCHIVE (Dec. 29, 2008),
https://web.archive.org/web/20081229232913/http://www.bankgeschichte.de/e/04_01_0
1_01.html [https://perma.cc/BN43-GL5H].
38 Bond No. 1989/3, art. 6(2), TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 109; Likin, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/likin [https://perma.cc/4AZ7YGM9] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
39 Chihyun Chang, Modern China’s Customs Services: A Brief Introduction, 地理資
FOR
GIS,
RCHSS,
ACADEMIA
SINICA],
訊科學研究專題中心
[CTR.
http://gis.rchss.sinica.edu.tw/cmcs/modern-china%E2%80%99s-customs-services-abrief-introduction#p7 [https://perma.cc/LQ9Y-FYM4] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
40 Bond No. 1989/3, art. 6(2), TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 109.
41 See generally Bond No. 1895/1, Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corp.)-China, Final Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government Seven per Cent
Silver Loan of 1894 (Jan. 26, 1895), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 11–14;
Bond No. 1895/2, Gr. Brit. (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp.)-China, Final
Agreement for the Chinese Imperial Government Six per Cent Sterling Loan of 1895 (Jan.
26, 1895), reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 15-17.
42 Denby, supra note 35, at 56–58.
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Bonds’ to HSBC, which “assigns to and charges in favor of [HSBC]
sufficient of the Customs Revenue at all or any [] ports . . . to meet
and pay off all the Customs Bonds which have been handed to
[HSBC]”, who would in turn pay the bondholders from the Customs
revenue. 43 This Silver Loan had no priority clause. 44 However, the
Sterling Loan had a priority clause with similar language to the Gold
Loan of 1898. 45
On the eve of its collapse, the last imperial government in China,
the Qing Dynasty, issued bonds to finance railway expansion and
nationalization projects. 46 The bonds were underwritten by a
consortium of French, German, British and American banks. 47 In a
roughly contemporaneous assessment, the debt incurred was the
first capital attracted for internal development. 48 The railway bonds
of this period generally did not share the same level of bondholder
protection as the bonds discussed above. For example, the ‘Chinese
Imperial Railway 5% Gold Loan’ of 1911 for the construction of
the Shanghai to Nanking railroad was secured by the railway, and
any “land, materials, rolling-stock, buildings, property, and
premises of every description purchased . . . by the railway[]
hereinafter referred to, and on the last-mentioned railways
themselves as and when constructed and on the revenue of all
descriptions derivable therefrom.” 49 The bond contains priority
only over the security: “until [redemption], no part of the land
comprised in the mortgage security or the railway and its
appurtenances shall be transferred or given to another party, and that
the rights of the first mortgage shall not in any way be impaired[.]” 50

43
44
45
46

9.

Bond No. 1895/1, art. 15, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 13.
See id. at 11–14.
Bond No. 1895/2, art. 9, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 16.
See Manman Huang, Hukuang Railway Bonds of 1911, FIN. HIST., Fall 2013, at 8-

47 See, e.g., British & Chinese Corp., Ltd., Chinese Imperial Railway 5% Gold Loan
for ₺3,250,000 Sterling 1 (Dec. 2, 1904) (bond contract) (on file with note author)
[hereinafter 5% Gold Loan of 1911].
48 Denby, supra note 35.
49 Bond No. 1903/2, Gr. Brit. (Brit. & Chinese Corp., Ltd.)-China, art. 3, Agreement
for a Loan for the Construction of a Railway from Shanghai to Nanking (July 9, 1903),
reprinted in TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 389.
50 5% Gold Loan of 1911, supra note 47.
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Republican Era Bonds
Within months of the 1911 railway bond issue, a successful
revolt against Qing rule was launched, culminating on January 1,
1912, with the declaration of the Republic of China. 51 In this
turbulent period from 1912 to 1949, successive governments
required foreign borrowing to manage perennial fiscal problems. 52
The Qing government was decisively overthrown on February 12,
1912, during the Xinhai Revolution through an alliance between
Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) and the de facto
leader of the Beiyang army (the major Qing military force) Yuan
Shikai. 53 Shikai became a de facto dictator, even declaring himself
emperor, from 1912 until his death in 1916. 54 Many provinces
declared their independence, until the establishment of the
Nationalist government in Nanking in 1926, which had control over
most of the country by 1928. 55 The Nationalists achieved this
degree of unification through the military venture known as the
Northern Expedition. 56 This period saw a degree of relative stability
under the Nationalists, despite a war with the Communist party, up
until the beginning of World War II, when Japan invaded China. 57
51 The emperor and the royal family abdicated the throne in February of 1912. The
Chinese Revolution of 1911, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE ARCHIVE, https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ip/88116.htm [https://perma.cc/4E9T-LWKH] (last visited
Nov. 9, 2020).
52 Governments in the period of Republican China struggled fiscally with chronic
military and police expenditures, heavy debt service and indemnity payments, and
inconsistent revenue sources. Albert Feuerwerker, Economic Trends, 1912-49, in 12 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA: REPUBLICAN CHINA 1912-1949, PART 1 28, 100-05 (Denis
Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1983) (“Between 1912 and 1926, 27 domestic bond
issuances were floated by the Ministry of Finance . . . .”).
53 See Joseph W. Esherick, Introduction to CHINA: HOW THE EMPIRE FELL 1, 2–14
(Joseph W. Esherick & C. Z. George Wei eds., Routledge 2014); Li Xizhu, Provincial
Officials in 1911-12: Their Backgrounds and Reactions to Revolution—An Inquiry into the
Structure of “Weak Center, Weak Regions” in the Late Qing, in CHINA: HOW THE EMPIRE
FELL, supra, at 159–76.
54 See, e.g., Esherick, supra note 53, at 3–4, 6.
55 See THE GENERALISSIMO: CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERN
CHINA 54–63, 77–105 (Jay Taylor ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2009) (1931).
56 See id. at 49–96.
57 See, e.g., Introduction to 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING
EFFORTS, 1927-1937 ix, x–xvii (Paul K. T. Sih ed., St. John’s Univ. Press 1970); Dison H.
Poe, Political Reconstruction, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S
NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, supra, at 33, 73–79; Arthur N. Young, China’s
Fiscal Transformation, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-
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In the last month of the Xinhai Revolution, the Provisional
Government issued the “8% Military Loan of the Republic of
China.” 58 The purpose of the bond was “for military emergencies
and the preservation of peace and order[,]” and all proceeds from
the issuance were limited to that use. 59 This bond was secured by
tax revenues on grain. 60 The bond matured in six years, but required
redemption within two years after maturity or the bond expired. 61
The coupons expired within six months. 62
As the situation settled, the new government issued bonds in
Belgium 63 and Great Britain. 64 These issuances were “designed to
provide funds . . . to consolidate the Central and Local
Governments, to assure the satisfactory administration of the State
and Provinces and/or to relieve the distress prevailing among the
people and in commercial circles.” 65 The issuances have some
different terms: for instance, the British issue granted the
bondholder priority only over any bond “charged on the [same]
revenue[,]” which was revenues from the Salt Tax. 66 The Belgian
bond was not protected by such explicit guarantees. 67

BUILDING EFFORTS, 1927-1937, supra, at 83, 120–21; Theodore H. Chen, Education in
China, 1927-1937, in 9 THE STRENUOUS DECADE: CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS,
1927-1937, supra, at 289, 291–94.
58 Bond No. 1912/1, China, Regulations for the 8% Military Loan of the Republic of
China (Jan. 8, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 929-31.
59 Id. at 929 (quoting Article 5).
60 Id. at 930 (referring to Article 16, which states “The security for this loan shall be
the grain tax of the nation”).
61 Id.
62 Id. (referring to Article 18).
63 Bond No. 1912/4, Belg. (Banque Sino-Belge)-China, Agreement for the Chinese
Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912 (Mar. 14, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2,
supra note 22, at 947-50.
64 Bond No. 1912/9, Gr. Brit. (G. Birch Crisp & Co.)-China, Agreement for the
Chinese Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912, reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra
note 22, at 967-73.
65 Bond No. 1912/4, art. 2, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 948; see also Bond No.
1912/9, art. 2, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 968 (“The Loan [with Great Britain] [wa]s
designed to provide capital for the repayment of existing loans and for the reorganization
of the Government and for productive works.”).
66 Bond No. 1912/9, art. 4(5), TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 968-69.
67 Bond No. 1912/4, Belg. (Banque Sino-Belge)-China, Agreement for the Chinese
Government Five per Cent Gold Loan of 1912 (Mar. 14, 1912), reprinted in TREATIES 2,
supra note 22, at 947-50.
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The new government also issued bonds to help fund
infrastructure projects like railroads and canals. 68 The author of this
work was unable to find any bond contract terms for post-1919
bonds. However, this paper is still relevant to those bonds. The
Concluding Framework outlines the type of bond terms required
that are more amenable to suit, and post-1919 bond terms can be
compared with the terms amenable to suit. 69
B. The PRC Succession to Power, Default and Non-Payment
On September 21, 1949, after a revolutionary struggle lasting
dozens of years, Chairman Mao proclaimed the PRC, whereupon
his new government defaulted on all bonds issued during the
Imperial and Nationalist eras. 70 To announce the rejection of any
obligations incurred by the Imperial or Nationalist governments, the
new government issued a communique in 1955 to foreign
governments that “the PRC had not the ability to pay [the pre-1949]
debt burden[.]” 71 The PRC wrote an aide memoire to the U.S. State
Department “asserting that the PRC should have no obligation to
pay th[ose] debts[.]” 72 Unsurprisingly, the government of Taiwan,
who claims to be the legitimate continuation of the Republic of
China, believes the PRC is liable for the debt. 73
C. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
American bondholders sought to collect on this debt under the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949 (“ICSA”). 74 In 1970,
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“FCSC”) considered a

See, e.g., id; Bond No. 1912/9, TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 967-73.
See infra Parts II & III.
70 RADHEY S. CHAURASIA, HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA 197-98, 314 (Atlantic
Publishers & Distribs. 2004); China, Britain Settle Claims, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1987, at
D9, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/08/business/china-britain-settle-claims.html [https
://perma.cc/8Z4L-AV79].
71 See H.R. Con. Res. 160, 110th Cong. (2007) (recommending that the PRC be
denied access to U.S. capital markets until it complies with the WTO Agreement terms
and conditions and honors its outstanding defaulted public debts owed to U.S. citizens).
72 See id.
73 Keoni Everington, Taiwan Not Required to Pay Qing Dynasty Bonds, China Is:
Former Premier, TAIWAN NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/
en/news/3773698 [https://perma.cc/B42B-XLXG].
74 See generally 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. (codified text of the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949 (“ICSA”]).
68
69
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claim to recuperate the pre-1949 debt using the ICSA. 75 However,
the FCSC concluded in Decision No. CN-147 that the Act only
covered claims for losses suffered against the Government of the
PRC, and because the bonds had been in default ten years prior to
the Communist assumption of power, the claims were not covered. 76
The ICSA granted the FCSC the ‘final word’ on claims: “[t]he
action of the Commission in allowing or denying any claim . . . shall
be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and not
subject to review by . . . any court[.]” 77 Because the pre-1949 bond
claims were not covered by the ICSA, the legal obligations owed on
those bonds were not extinguished under U.S. law.
D. China Enters the Global Capital Market
Because the bonds were not extinguished by the FCSC and
ICSA, the PRC was constrained by bondholders when it attempted
to gain access to Western capital markets. As China pursued market
reforms in the late 1970s, it was desperate for foreign capital to fund
development. 78 China first opened up Special Economic Zones to
encourage foreign investment on the Chinese mainland. 79 To access
the British bond market, China negotiated a deal with the British
government in 1986 to settle with British bondholders of old
Chinese bonds. 80 In March of 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 81 an Eleventh
Circuit decision which dismissed a suit by an American holder of
pre-1949 Chinese bonds. 82 The same month, the Bank of China was
able to borrow $150 million from a U.S. lender. 83 To China, the old
See generally Complaint, Harper, No. 5:18-cv-00436.
Id. at 4.
77 22 U.S.C. § 1623(h).
78 See IMF, CHINA’S GROWTH AND INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY:
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 1 (2004), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/op/232/op232.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZA2-6PXA].
79 See id. at 2, 52.
80 China, Britain Settle Claims, supra note 70.
81 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
82 See generally id. (dismissing on the argument that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 did not apply retroactively; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this
in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), discussed infra); China, Britain
Settle Claims, supra note 70.
83 Settlement of Bond Issue Clears Way: China Again Borrowing Money in U.S. After
38 Years, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 1987) https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-0575
76
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debt was where it belonged: in history.
III. Jurisdiction in United States Federal Courts
In Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, the Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the claims against the PRC based on lack of jurisdiction. 84
This Section explains how this decision was incorrect and that a
district court could have jurisdiction over the PRC in a pre-1949
bond case.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Sovereigns
A threshold question for a plaintiff seeking to recover on pre1949 bonds is whether federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over China. 85 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (“FSIA”) confers jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 86
The law has evolved over time to favor bondholders.
1. Schooner Exchange and Absolute Immunity
The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity in 1812 in the case of The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon. 87 The Schooner Exchange (the “Exchange”) was a
merchant schooner owned by two Marylanders, who in 1809 sent
the ship on a voyage to Spain. 88 A year later the ship was seized by
Napoleon and converted into a French warship. 89 When the ship
was required to put in for repairs in Philadelphia, the Maryland
owners tried to reclaim the ship. 90 The district court dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds and the circuit court reversed. 91 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Court considered “whether an American
citizen can assert, in an American court, a title to [property of a
foreign sovereign].” 92
26-fi-2786-story.html [https://perma.cc/9GB8-K2JN].
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1491–92.
86 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C.§§ 1330, 1332,
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611.
87 11 U.S. 116 (1812).
88 Id. at 117.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 119–20.
92 Id. at 136.
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U.S. Attorney General William Pinkney 93 argued that complete
sovereign immunity was a long-standing convention of
international law, stretching as far back as the Iron Age Phoenician
merchant-cities of Tyre and Sidon. 94 Chief Justice John Marshall,
using his characteristic syllogistic reasoning, determined that: (1)
“[t]he jurisdiction of courts is a branch of . . . a nation[’s]
independent sovereign power”; (2) any exception “to the full and
complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced
to the [explicit or implicit] consent of the nation itself”; (3) the
world consists of “distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights
and equal independence”; and (4) to further the “common interest
[of] mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with
each other[,]” sovereigns consent to waive their exclusive
jurisdiction in favor of another. 95 Chief Justice Marshall thus found
that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the French warship
because the international convention was for sovereigns to waive
jurisdiction over entities of other sovereigns (e.g., ambassadors,
armies, and ships in the service of the sovereign power) to promote
comity between the two sovereigns, and the political branches had
not acted contrariwise. 96
While the Schooner Exchange case was narrowly about foreign
warships, “that opinion came to be regarded as extending virtually
absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns.” 97 For example, in Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 98 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Schooner Exchange also applied to merchant ships owned and
operated by a foreign sovereign. 99 An important component of this
precedent was that the grant of immunity to foreign sovereigns was
itself an act of the sovereign, 100 and the sovereign was free to

93 William Pinkney ratified the U.S. Constitution as an elected delegate of the
Maryland Constitutional Convention. WILLIAM PINKNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PINKNEY,
BY HIS NEPHEW 17 (Adamant Media Corp. 2005) (1853).
94 Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 134.
95 Id. at 136–37 (clarifying that a nation’s consent could be implicit).
96 Id. at 137–43.
97 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (citing Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926)).
98 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
99 See id. at 573–74, 576.
100 Only a sovereign can waive the right to enforce sovereign power on the
sovereign’s territory. See Berizzi Bros. Co., 271 U.S. at 573–74.
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enforce its sovereign prerogative if it so chose. 101 Chief Justice
Burger explained this in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria:
The Schooner Exchange made clear[] [that] foreign sovereign
immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part of the United
States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.
Accordingly, [the U.S. Supreme] Court consistently has deferred
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of
the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over
actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities. 102

Tate Letter and Restrictive Immunity
On May 19, 1952, the Acting Legal Adviser to the State
Department, Jack B. Tate, signed a letter (the “Tate Letter” or the
“Letter”) addressed to the Acting Attorney General, Philip B.
Perlman, 103
with a self-explanatory title: “Changed Policy
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign
Governments.” 104 The Tate Letter reveals that the State Department
had “for sometime [been] consider[ing] the question [of] whether
the practice of the Government[,] in granting immunity from suit to
foreign governments made [] defendant[s] without their consent[,]
should not be changed.” 105 According to Tate’s research, there were
two competing theories of sovereign immunity: (1) absolute
sovereign immunity, in which “a sovereign cannot, without his
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign”
and (2) restrictive sovereign immunity, where “immunity is
recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of
a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).” 106 At
the time it was written, the Tate Letter estimated that the United
States, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Poland, Brazil,
Chile, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, and Portugal
subscribed to absolute immunity; the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Argentina had begun to transition towards restrictive immunity; the
See id.; see also Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486, 488.
Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 486.
103 See generally Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to
Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Changed Policy Concerning the
Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26
DEPT. ST. BULL. 984 [hereinafter Tate Letter].
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
101
102
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German Supreme Court was waiting for the doctrine of restrictive
immunity to develop further; and Belgium, Italy, Egypt,
Switzerland, France, Austria, Greece, Romania, Peru, and Denmark
had adopted the restrictive immunity theory. 107
Only a few years after the 1926 Berizzi Bros. decision, ten of the
absolute immunity countries “ratified the Brussels Convention of
1926 under which immunity for government owned merchant
vessels is waived.” 108 Indeed, by the time of the Tate letter, the
United States, while not a signatory to the Brussels convention, had
adopted “a policy of not claiming immunity for its public owned or
operated merchant vessels.” 109 Tate’s research indicated to him that
the global trend was leaning towards restrictive immunity, with the
Soviet Union being the only great power fighting against the move,
protesting lawsuits over Tsarist-era bonds and contracts. 110 The
Letter concludes that “the widespread and increasing practice on the
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities” and “the
granting of sovereign immunity to foreign governments in the
[United States] courts . . . is [] inconsistent with the action of the
Government of the United States in subjecting itself to suit in these
same courts in both contract and tort and with its long established
policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its
merchant vessels.” 111 Tate acknowledged that the Letter itself had
no direct legal impact, but understood that “the courts are less likely
to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where the executive has
declined to do so.” 112
Regarding sovereign immunity in domestic matters, John
Marshall once held “that when a government becomes a partner in
any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that country, of its sovereign character, and takes that
of a private citizen.” 113 In practice, the Tate Letter meant the United
States had withdrawn its consent from exempting commercial
China in this case is likely meant to refer to the Republic of China. See id.
Id. at 985.
109 Tate Letter, supra note 103, at 985.
110 Tate mentions that the United Kingdom is still in support of absolute sovereignty,
but that there “are evidences that British authorities are aware of its deficiencies and ready
for a change.” Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. 904, 907 (1824).
107
108

406

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

activities of foreign sovereigns from American territorial
jurisdiction and began treating them as “a private citizen.”
Lead Up to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976
Even though the Tate Letter indicated that the executive branch
had shifted to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, there
was no legislative action to codify the decision: courts facing
foreign sovereign immunity questions had to look for guidance from
the State Department. 114 Monroe Leigh, a legal adviser to the U.S.
State Department, described the result as a “peculiar and, in my
view, outdated practice of having a political institution, namely, the
State Department, decide many of these questions of law.” 115 In his
testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee, Leigh
described the process of suing a foreign sovereign:
Under our current system, after a foreign-state defendant raises
the defense of sovereign immunity, it has an option: either the
foreign state can litigate this legal defense entirely in court, or, as
is more usually the case, it can make a formal diplomatic request
to have the State Department decide the issue.
If it does the latter, and if the State Department believes that
immunity is appropriate, the State Department asks the
Department of Justice to file a “suggestion of immunity” with the
court hearing the case. 116

In 1943, the Supreme Court held that once a court received this
“suggestion of immunity” from the State Department, the court
must accept such “as a conclusive determination by the political arm
of the Government that the continued [legal action] interferes with
the proper conduct of our foreign relations.” 117 After the State
See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487.
Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. L. and Governmental Rels. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary on
H.R. 11315, 94th Cong. 24–29 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t
of State, accompanied by Michael Sandler, Legal Adviser’s Officer, Dep’t of State)
[hereinafter FSIA Hearings].
116 Id. at 26.
117 Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943); see also FSIA Hearings,
supra note 115, at 26 (“Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Peru, which was
decided in 1943, U.S. courts to automatically defer to such suggestions of immunity from
the executive branch.”).
114
115
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Department adopted the restrictive immunity theory in the Tate
Letter, it had to determine whether specific actions of a foreign
sovereign brought in district courts were jure imperii or jure
gestionis.
By the 1970s, the majority of countries had adopted the
restrictive theory of immunity in full, where international sovereign
immunity defenses were “decided exclusively by the courts and not
by institutions concerned with foreign affairs.” 118 This asymmetry
between U.S. courts and foreign courts created a competitive
disadvantage for the United States and for Americans engaged in
commercial endeavors with foreign sovereigns. 119 The United
States would always be liable for suit under the restrictive theory in
foreign courts, whereas foreign powers could have an “ordinary
legal dispute . . . artificially raised to the level of a diplomatic
problem through the [foreign] government’s intercession with the
State Department.” 120 Similarly, there was market certainty in
contracting with foreign governments for individuals living in
countries with restrictive immunity, whereas U.S. citizens risked
having a foreign sovereign violate a contract and escape liability by
lobbying the State Department. 121
The FSIA
On October 21, 1976, President Gerald Ford signed the FSIA
into law. 122 The FSIA officially codified the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity into U.S. law. 123 Congress passed the law “in
order to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic
pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to ‘assur[e]
litigants that . . . decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process[.]’” 124
Broadly, the FSIA extends a blanket immunity from the
FSIA Hearings, supra note 115, at 27.
See id.
120 Id.
121 See id.
122 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611; see also Actions
Overview: H.R. 11315 – 94th Congress (1975-1976), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/94th-congress/house-bill/11315/actions
[https://perma.cc/ZS25-QR7H] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
123 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
124 Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 7 (1976))
(alteration and omission in original).
118
119
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jurisdiction of federal and state courts. 125 But the statute lists a
number of exceptions. 126
Pre-1949 bondholders can avail
themselves of one of these exceptions, such as the “commercial
activity exception” for actions based “upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States[.]” 127 Any claim which can be brought
under FSIA § 1605 (the FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity)
can also be brought as a counterclaim. 128 If an exception applies,
then “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances[.]”129
While foreign sovereigns can be brought into either state or federal
court, 130 foreign states have the right to remove any civil action to
federal court. 131
B. The Applicability of the FSIA Commercial Activity
Exception to Pre-1949 Bonds
The commercial activity exception lists three acts which grant
federal and state courts jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign: (1) an
act that “is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state;” (2) “an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere;” and (3) “an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States[.]” 132 For sovereign bonds, the commercial activity is
the issuance of the bonds. 133 For holders of pre-1949 bonds, the act
which causes injury is breach of the bond contract. 134 As will be
See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
See id. § 1605.
127 Two other clauses in § 1605(a)(2) seem less likely to apply: where “the action is
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or
upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere. . . .” Id. § 1605(a)(2).
128 See id. § 1607.
129 Id. § 1606.
130 See id. § 1604.
131 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
132 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
133 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615–16 (1992).
134 See, e.g., id. at 620.
125
126
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discussed further in this Part, the determination of which of the three
exceptions apply to pre-1949 bondholders depends on where the
bonds were issued and the nature of the breach of contract. 135 Each
of the elements of this statutory requirement is considered below, as
well as the question of whether the FSIA applies to claims arising
before the Act was passed in 1976.
1. What is a “Foreign State”?
The PRC should be considered a “foreign state” for the purposes
of the FSIA. However, the Act does not define the term “foreign
state.” 136 The legislative history of the FSIA shows that Congress
intended to “transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from
the executive branch to the judicial branch[.]” 137 The “decisions on
claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the
judiciary . . . incorporat[ing] standards recognized under
international law.” 138 Thus, U.S. courts have the discretion to make
the determination of whether a state is a “foreign state” for the
purposes of the Act, as long as the decision tracks international
law. 139
The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States defines a “state” as “an entity that has a defined
territory and population under the control of a government and that
engages in foreign relations.” 140 The Second Circuit, combining
Supreme Court precedents and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, adopted the following
See infra Section II.B.
The Act states that “foreign state” “includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” yet does not define “foreign state.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
137 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
138 Id. at 14.
139 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 452 n.1 (A. L. I. 2018).
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 4
(A.L.I. 1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (A.L.I. 1987) (“[A] state is an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”); RESTATEMENT
(FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 452 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2018)
(“[S]tates are generally understood as sovereign independent entities that have a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with
other states.”).
135
136
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definitions:
[S]overeign statehood [includes] the power to declare and wage
war; to conclude peace; to maintain diplomatic ties with other
sovereigns; to acquire territory by discovery and occupation; and
to make international agreements and treaties.
Under
international law, a state is said to be an entity possessed of a
defined territory and a permanent population, controlled by its
own government, and engaged in or capable of engaging in
relations with other such entities. 141

Based on the above definitions, it seems evident that the PRC is
a “state” for purposes of the FSIA. What if a state meets these
requirements, but is not recognized as a state by the political
branches of the government, as was the case with the PRC until
1970? The Restatement (Third) states that “an entity not recognized
as a state, or a regime not recognized as the government of a state,
is ordinarily denied access to courts in the United States[.]” 142
However, this only prohibits an unrecognized state from being a
plaintiff in U.S. courts, and even this prohibition can be lifted
(without recognition of the state by the government) at the behest of
the political branches. 143
Pre-Tate Letter, courts granted sovereign immunity to
unrecognized states as defendants. 144 The Court of Appeals of New
York held that, even though unrecognized as a state, the Russian
Socialist Federative Soviet Republic was “an existing government
sovereign within its own territories.” 145 The court reasoned that
“‘[t]o cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court for any
complaint against him in his public capacity is contrary to the law
of nations and an insult which he is entitled to resent[,]’” 146 and that
“[s]uch is not the proper method of redress if a citizen of the United
141 Morgan Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1243 (2d Cir.
1991) (citing United States v. Curitss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–19 (1936);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (A.L.I.
1987).
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
205(1) (A.L.I. 1987).
143 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408–12 (1964); Nat’l
Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1988).
144 Wulfsohn v. Russ. Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 374–76
(1923).
145 Id. at 376.
146 Id. (quoting De Haber v. Queen of Portugal (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1255).
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States is wronged. The question is a political one, not confided to
the courts, but to another department of government.” 147
It is unclear how a court would have dealt with an unrecognized
state defendant after the Tate Letter or after the passage of the FSIA.
It seems altogether easier for a court and the government to dismiss
a case against an unrecognized state when the law of the land is
absolute sovereign immunity; but when an unrecognized foreign
sovereign is liable for commercial actions, it puts the court and the
government in a trickier situation regarding service of process,
execution of court orders, etc.
The United States has by statute granted certain unrecognized
states the same legal rights and liabilities as a recognized sovereign:
for instance, the Taiwan Relations Act allows Taiwan to sue and be
sued in domestic courts. 148
2. What is a “Commercial Activity”?
China’s bond issuances constitute a “commercial activity.”
“Commercial activity” is defined as “either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or
act.” 149 “[C]ommercial activity carried on in the United States by a
foreign state” is defined as “commercial activity carried on by such
state and having substantial contact with the United States.” 150 An
evaluating court determines whether an activity is commercial by
“reference to the nature of the . . . act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.” 151
For the purposes of the FSIA, courts have consistently
determined that sovereign bond issuances are a commercial
activity. 152 The Supreme Court examines whether an activity is
“commercial” based on the “nature” of the activity. 153 Because
private parties, as well as governments, issue bonds “to raise
capital[,] finance purchases, [or] refinance debt[,]” 154 the activity is
the “type of action[] by which a private party engages in ‘trade and
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Id.
22 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3316.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
Id. § 1603(e).
Id. § 1603(d).
E.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 615–17.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 616.
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traffic or commerce[.]’” 155 The Supreme Court has thus concluded
that “issuance of [bonds is] a ‘commercial activity’ under the
FSIA.” 156
3. What is a “Direct Effect”?
The “direct effect” requirement is the most nuanced and difficult
challenge a plaintiff is likely to face. 157 The Act does not define the
term “direct effect.” 158 If an action by a foreign state upon which a
claim is brought happens outside the United States, the “commercial
activity” exception to sovereign immunity will only apply where the
act is “in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States[.]” 159
Similar to how “United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(Alcoa) 160 extended the territorial jurisdiction principle to include
effects within the United States, regardless of origin” by allowing
American antitrust laws to reach foreign nationals when there were
“‘substantial,’ ‘material,’ or ‘direct’ effects” on the United States, 161
this “direct effect” clause of the FSIA commercial activity
exception allows plaintiffs to sue foreign sovereigns in United
States courts when “direct effects” from foreign actions is found. 162
Unlike federal antitrust law, however, the commercial exception in
the FSIA does not “contain[] any unexpressed requirement of
‘substantiality’ or ‘foreseeability.’” 163
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 164 Argentina had
“unilateral[ly] rescehdul[ed the] maturity dates” on bonds held by
Id. at 614 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
Id. at 617.
157 “Fourteen years after the FSIA was enacted, the circuits remain divided on how to
interpret the direct effects clause.” Hadwin A. Card III, Interpreting the Direct Effects
Clause of the FSIA’s Commercial Activity Exception, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 91 (1990).
158 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). The Act mentions that a foreign state “includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state[,]”
but does not define “foreign state.” Id. § 1603.
159 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
160 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
161 Charles T. Plambeck, Holding the Antitrust Line: Laker Airways v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 10 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 251, 256, 257 n.41 (1985).
162 See id.
163 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618; see also Plambeck, supra note 161, at 257 n.41.
164 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
155
156
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the plaintiffs. 165 The plaintiffs were two Panamanian corporations
and a Swiss bank who had “declined to accept the rescheduling and
insisted on repayment in New York.” 166 The plaintiffs sued for
breach of contract. 167 The Supreme Court “reject[ed] Argentina’s
suggestion that the ‘direct effect’ requirement cannot be satisfied
where the plaintiffs are all foreign corporations with no other
connections to the United States[,]” and that because the plaintiffs
“had designated their accounts in New York as the place of
payment, and Argentina made some interest payments into those
accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the
payments[,] the rescheduling of those obligations necessarily had a
‘direct effect’ in [the United States.]” 168 Quite simply, “[m]oney
that was supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for
deposit was not forthcoming.” 169
Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) 170 further
emphasized that even where “the letter of credit did not itself
specify New York as the place of payment . . . when [plaintiff]
specified New York in its correspondence, [defendant] had already
impliedly agreed to New York as place of payment.” 171 The Second
Circuit summarized the direct effect requirement regarding
breaches of contract: “[e]very circuit court of which we are aware
that has addressed this issue has held . . . that an anticipatory
contractual breach occurs ‘in the United States’ for [the FSIA]
purposes if performance could have been required in the United
States and then was requested there.” 172
An illustrative case, Morris v. People’s Republic of China,
concerning, incidentally, pre-1949 Chinese bonds was dismissed
because of the lack of “direct effects” in the United States. 173 The
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

2002).

Id. at 618.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 619.
Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 132.
Virtual Countries, Inc. v. Republic of South Africa, 300 F.3d 230, 239 (2d Cir.

173 See Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 478 F.Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(holding that the criterion of direct effects was unmet both for the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and for commercial activity in the United States); see also Jackson, 794
F.2d 1490 (dismissing on the grounds that the FSIA was not retroactive); Altmann, 541
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plaintiffs were individuals “seeking to recover on defaulted bonds
issued by the PRC’s predecessor government in 1913.” 174 The PRC
moved to dismiss, in part on the grounds that the PRC had sovereign
immunity because the commercial activity exception did not apply
in this case. 175 The plaintiff argued the third prong of the
commercial activity exception applied: where a foreign sovereign
commits an act abroad, in connection with commercial activity
abroad, that has a direct effect in the United States. 176
The court determined that the commercial activity exception did
not apply, and, thus, the PRC had sovereign immunity, because the
plaintiff “has not made a showing of a ‘direct effect’ as required by
the statute.” 177 First, the court noted that the plaintiff “purchased his
bonds over sixty years after the PRC’s predecessor government
defaulted in 1939 and forty years after the bonds matured[,]”
consequently lacking the “immediacy required[.]” 178 The court
determined that the “act of purchasing the bonds many decades after
default [ . . . ] is an intervening act breaking the causal
relationship.” 179 The plaintiff was not harmed because “the legally
significant acts . . . [were] felt in 1939 and 1960, not in 2000 when
the plaintiff purchased and [sic] the defaulted bonds in a
‘collectibles’ market.” 180
However, the court stated that “[n]othing in the commercial
activity exception expressly limits cognizable effects to those felt
solely by plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff could arguably rely on the effect
felt by the former holders of his bonds.” 181 If the plaintiff could
have proven that at one point the default had a direct effect in the
United States through the previous holders, then the court could find
a direct effect; unfortunately, the plaintiff never put forward any
evidence to this effect. 182

U.S. 677 (holding that the FSIA is retroactive).
174 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
175 Id. at 565–66.
176 Id. at 563; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
177 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 568–69.
181 Id. at 569.
182 Id. at 569 n.12 (citing Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to remit funds to third-party banks in New York had a
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Factors which the court would have considered to have
implicated a direct effect include: (1) “prior ownership of plaintiff’s
bonds by U.S. citizens or corporations at the time of any default”;
(2) whether “issuing banks were located in the United States”; (3)
whether “[t]he bonds were [] issued or payable in U.S. currency”;
(4) whether the PRC had a “designated agent to administer the
bonds in the United States”; (5) whether “negotiations concerning
the bond issuance or payment occurred within the United States”;
and (6) “importantly, [where] the contractually designated locations
where payments of principal and interest were to be paid[.]” 183
Because (1) plaintiff never showed evidence of prior ownership
of the bond; (2) plaintiff’s bonds were not issued to American banks
and there were no designated locations or negotiations in the United
States; and (3) the bonds were not in U.S. dollars, the court found
that plaintiff did not suffer a direct effect in the United States. 184
4. Retroactivity
China should not be able to assert absolute immunity under the
pre-FSIA sovereign immunity doctrine, because the FSIA
effectively is retroactive. In 2004, the Supreme Court heard
Republic of Austria v. Altmann. 185 The plaintiff had discovered that
“her uncle’s valuable art works had either been seized by the Nazis
or expropriated by Austria after World War II,” and she filed suit to
recover said art. 186 Plaintiff sued under the FSIA, and Austria
moved to dismiss on the grounds that when the art was taken, the
United States still followed the theory of absolute immunity, and
“nothing in the FSIA retroactively divests [Austria] of that
immunity.” 187
The Supreme Court disagreed. 188 The Court found that
Congress intended for the FSIA to create conformity in regard to

direct effect in the United States)); see also Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941
F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Because defendants’ breach of the [bond] agreement
deprived plaintiffs of their contractual rights to receive payment . . . , defendants’ acts
caused a direct effect to plaintiffs.”).
183 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71.
184 Id. at 571.
185 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (holding that the FSIA is retroactive).
186 Id. at 677.
187 Id.
188 See id.
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how courts decided assertions of immunity, quoting the Act:
“[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be
decided by courts of the United States and of the States in
conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.” 189 The
Court interpreted this provision to mean that any assertion of
immunity from the date the FSIA was enacted would be examined
under the FSIA principles, regardless of when the original claim
arose. 190
Responding to fears that allowing retroactivity would “open[]
foreign nations worldwide to vast and potential liability for
expropriation claims in regards to conduct that occurred generations
ago[,]” 191 Justice Breyer wrote in his concurrence that “statutes of
limitations, personal jurisdiction and venue requirements, and the
doctrine of forum non conveniens will limit the number of suits
brought in American courts.” 192
IV. Defenses of the PRC
If a U.S. court grants jurisdiction, the PRC will assert three
defenses, discussed in turn below.
A. Successor Government
Though it was not argued in Morris, in prior cases against the
PRC, China has argued that the People’s Republic is not the
successor to the Imperial Qing or Nationalist governments. 193 It is
unlikely this argument would succeed. Customary international law
provides for two types of succession: (1) succession of states and
(2) succession of governments. 194 The Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States provides that a
succession of state “may create a discontinuity in statehood
[whereas] a succession of government [] leaves statehood
unaffected.” 195 The Restatement maintains that “[w]hen a state
189
190
191
192
193

1982).

Id. at 697 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602) (emphasis added in original).
Id. at 697–99.
Altmann, 541 U.S. at 730 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 713 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869, 872 (N.D. Ala.

194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 208
n.2 (A.L.I. 1987).
195 Id.
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succeeds another state with respect to particular territory, the
capacities, rights, and duties of the predecessor state with respect to
that territory terminate and are assumed by the successor state[.]” 196
The “capacities, rights, and duties [of a state] are not affected by a
mere change in the regime or in the form of government or its
ideology.” 197
U.S. courts have adopted the Restatement view. 198 As early as
1870, the Supreme Court held that “on . . . deposition [of the former
government] the sovereignty [of the state] does not change, but
merely the person or persons in whom it resides.” 199 U.S. courts
have determined that the Soviet government in Russia was the
successor government to the Tsarist government. 200 United States
v. National City Bank 201 involved claims brought by the United
States (from claims assigned to it by the Soviet government) against
the National City Bank. 202 The United States was attempting to
claim deposits at the National City Bank of $2.26 million originally
deposited by a Russian bank which had been nationalized by the
Soviet government (the Soviet claim against the bank’s deposits
being assigned to the United States). 203 The National City Bank
sought to offset this claim by arguing they were owed $4.43 million
for defaulted bonds they held, which had been issued by the Tsarist
Government. 204 The Court determined that the Soviet government
did inherit the obligation to pay the Tsarist bonds, elegantly arguing
“the State of Russia was the obligor on the Notes before the
revolution and the State of Russia continued as the obligor after the
revolution. The regime in power changed. The state, as a
continuing personality, persisted.” 205
Id. § 208.
Id. § 208 cmt. a.
198 See, e.g., Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp.
619, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The law is clear that the obligations of a state are unaffected
by a mere change in government.”).
199 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164, 168 (1870) (allowing the Court to hear a case that was
brought by Emperor Napoleon against Americans regarding a French vessel to continue
even after Napoleon was deposed).
200 E.g., United States v. Nat’l City Bank, 90 F. Supp. 448, 452 (S.D.N.Y 1950).
201 See generally id.
202 Id. at 452.
203 Id. at 451.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 452 (citing The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164; Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S.
196
197
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This principle was similarly applied regarding Sudan 206 and the
PRC in Jackson v. People’s Republic of China. 207 In Jackson, the
court held that “[t]he People’s Republic of China is the successor
government to the Imperial Chinese Government and, therefore, the
successor to its obligations.” 208 The PRC, in emerging victorious in
the Chinese Civil War, gained hegemony over the territory of the
former Republic of China, itself succeeding to the territory of
Imperial Qing. 209 Under international law, the PRC assumed the
rights and responsibilities of the Republic of China. 210 Change of
government through violent overthrow is still merely a change of
government in the eyes of international law. 211 And as discussed
supra, the determinations of a “foreign state” for the FSIA purposes
are to be examined through the lens of international law
principles. 212
The United States at one time did not recognize the PRC as the
legitimate sovereign, but this lack of recognition does not provide a

126 (1938)).
206 Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 619, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). The plaintiff was a transportation agent shipping agricultural products
from the United States to Sudan as part of a U.S. government program that allowed
developed nations to purchase agricultural goods with low interest rates and long
repayment periods. The plaintiff had been granted an exclusive license to operate as
Sudan’s agent for the purposes of this program. Id. at 620 n.2. The agreement between
the plaintiff and the Sudanese government was signed in October 1983 and granted the
exclusive license from October 1984 through September 1989. In January 1985, the
Sudanese government broke the agreement by granting the exclusive license to a different
shipping company. In April 1985, a military coup deposed the Sudanese government and
created a new regime. In June 1989, there was another military coup, installing a different
military regime. The plaintiff brought suit against the post-June 1989 military
government, arguing they breached the 1983 agreement. The military regime argued it
was neither responsible for the contractual obligations of the prior government, nor was it
responsible for the contractual obligations of the government before that one. Id. at 620.
The court held the new military regime liable for the contractual obligations of the preApril 1985 government, noting that “the obligations of a state are unaffected by a mere
change in government.” Id. at 623.
207 Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872.
208 Id.
209 See supra Section II.A.1
210 See Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872.
211 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
208 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1987); Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 872; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of
Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1927).
212 See supra Section III.B.1.
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defense for the PRC. For example, in Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.
v. Russia, 213 the plaintiff was the U.S. government on behalf of the
‘State of Russia’, pursuing the Valley Railroad Company for “loss
of explosives and ammunition [in Lehigh Valley’s possession]
while in transit from the United States to Russia[.]” 214 The Tsarist
government initiated the suit against Lehigh Valley, but upon the
overthrow of the Tsarist government, the provisional governmentin-exile was allowed to continue the suit. 215 The Second Circuit
determined that a nation consisted of two entities: (1) the state,
which “is a community or assemblage of men,” and (2) “the
government[, which is] the political agen[t] through which it acts in
international relations.” 216 The “state is perpetual, and survives the
form of its government. The recognized government may carry on
the suit, at least until the new government becomes accredited [by
the political branches].” 217 As the Eleventh Circuit noted during the
Jackson appeal, the United States has recognized the PRC as the
“political agent” of the ‘State of China’ since the 1970s.218
Accordingly, the law on successor governments would result in the
PRC inheriting the claims and obligations of the previous
government. 219 Upon recognition of the PRC by the United States,
a court would find that an obligation against the ‘State of China’ is
properly served against the PRC. 220
B. Odious Debt
Another defense China has previously argued is that any debt
incurred by a predecessor government is “odious debt.” 221 The
doctrine of odious debt is primarily an academic one as very few
courts have discussed the concept and none of them have reached
decisive holdings. 222 One author defines an odious debt as one that
See generally Lehigh Valley R. Co., 21 F.2d 396.
Id. at 399.
215 Id. at 400.
216 Id. (citing State of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 720 (1868); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 22–28 (1831)).
217 Id. at 401.
218 See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1491.
219 See Lehigh Valley, 21 F.2d at 399; Nat’l City Bank, 90 F. Supp. at 452.
220 See id.
221 See Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495; Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.6.
222 Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 605, 644–48 (2007) (defining the doctrine of “odious debt,” discussing the authorities
213
214
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is made: (1) in the “absence of the population’s consent, (2) absence
of benefit to the population, and (3) [with] the creditor’s awareness
of these facts.” 223
In 1956, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands denied the claim
of a “Dutch national employed in the Netherlands Indies
administration” who “claimed lost salary relating to a period of
internment” suffered under Japanese occupation during World War
II. 224 The Dutch national argued that the Netherlands was still
responsible for the salary, even though the obligation for that kind
of debt was transferred to Indonesia under treaty. 225 He believed
that because Indonesia would consider the debt odious and
repudiate it, the Netherlands was responsible for his pay. 226 The
Dutch court rejected the doctrine of odious debt, finding that “it had
no application to that case.” 227
In a series of arbitrations between the United States and the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in
response to an Iranian argument that a 1948 contract for materiel
from the United States was odious debt, also did not assert the
existence of the doctrine. 228 The Tribunal did state that “if such a
doctrine did exist, it did so only in cases of state and not government
succession.” 229
In the two cases brought in the United States regarding pre-1949
Chinese debt, the PRC argued in the alternative that it was not liable
for odious debts incurred by its predecessors. 230 But neither court
addressed the issue: one was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds
and the other on procedural grounds. 231
in international law, and identifying key issues in advocating for or critiquing the doctrine).
223 Id. at 630.
224 Id. at 645.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 645.
228 King, supra note 222, at 645–46 (citing United States v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
32 Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 162 (1996) (Chamber Two Award No. 574-B36-2 of 3 Dec.
1996)).
229 Id. at 646.
230 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495; Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.6.
231 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495 (finding no jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act because the Act did not apply retroactively – the Supreme Court would
find the Act to apply retroactively in 2004); Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (finding that
the statute of limitations had expired).
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With the doctrine of odious debt unsettled in international and
United State law, it is unlikely a U.S. court would recognize the
doctrine against American interest. 232 And even if the U.S. court
did acknowledge the doctrine, it would likely argue, as the IranUnited States Tribunal did, that it would not apply to debt incurred
by the Republic of China or the Imperial Qing government, because
the People’s Republic is only a successor government, not a
successor state.
C. Statute of Limitations
The third defense the PRC has asserted in the past is that the
statute of limitations bars recovery. But it is important to note that,
under federal law, a debt does not expire once the statute of
limitations has run its course. 233 Only Mississippi and Wisconsin
“have statutes that extinguish the debt upon the running of the
statute of limitations.” 234 The American Bar Association notes that
under federal law, debt is “an obligation to pay money[, but that
definition does not] include[] the qualifier that the debt is still
enforceable in court.” 235
For a court sitting in New York, the court “will apply New
York’s ‘borrowing statute,’ to determine what statute of limitations
to apply.” 236 Most bonds cases will likely be heard in a federal or
state court in New York as New York City’s preeminence as a
financial mecca induces governments to issue their bonds in the
state. 237 “The New York statute of limitations for bringing ‘an
232 See Louis A. Perez Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private
Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 699, 712 (2007) (recounting the rejection of the odious debt doctrine by an
arbitration overseen by the United States government regarding debt incurred by the
former dictator of the Dominican Republic owed to an American company).
233 Thomas R. Dominczyk, Collecting Time-Barred Debt: Is It Worth the Risk?,
A.B.A. (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/
blt/2014/04/04_dominczyk/ [https://perma.cc/UT2D-TXVA]; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
(defining consumer debt without inclusion of a qualifier that the debt is still enforceable
in court).
234 Dominczyk, supra note 233 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-3 (2018); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 893.05 (2020)).
235 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).
236 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 2019))
(internal citation omitted).
237 See Susan Black & Anella Munro, Why Issue Bonds Offshore?, 52 BANK INT’L
SETTLEMENTS PAPERS 97, 119 (2010).
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action upon a contractual obligation or liability’ is six years.”238
However, if the bond is “sold by the issuer after publication of an
advertisement for bids for the issue in a newspaper of general
circulation and secured only by a pledge of the faith and credit of
the issuer,” then the statute of limitations is 20 years. 239 Two
inquiries are then undertaken to determine when the statute of
limitations begins to run: (1) what is the injury and when does the
injury take place; and (2) can the statute of limitations be tolled?
Injury of Nonpayment of Principal and Interest
Regarding the statute of limitations for a bond, “when a contract
provides for the payment of money in installments, such as interest
installments, the statute of limitations runs on each installment from
the date it becomes due[.]” 240 For example, the ‘4½% Gold Loan of
1898’ has a 45-year maturity. 241 Issued on March 2, 1898, payments
were redeemable semi-annually on March 1 or September 1 until
the year 1943. 242 For the payment maturing on March 1, 1920, the
statute of limitations began running on March 1, 1920, and expired
March 1, 1926. 243 Consequently, the New York statute of
limitations expired for default on the last payment sometime in
1949. 244 Courts have, however, allowed the statute of limitations to
“toll” if a superior power prevents the injured party from seeking
redress. 245
Tolling from Lack of Forum due to a “Superior
Power”
A court may toll the statute of limitations if a “superior power”
intervened. 246 In the aftermath of the American Civil War, the
Supreme Court was tasked to determine how the war affected legal
rights of citizens in both the Union and the former Confederate
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2019)).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 211(a) (McKinney 2019).
240 Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex., 660 N.E.2d
1121, 1124–26 (N.Y. 1995).
241 Bond. No. 1898/3, art. 3, TREATIES 1, supra note 22, at 108.
242 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 37.
243 See id; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2) (McKinney 2019).
244 See id.
245 See infra Section III.C.2.
246 See generally Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532 (1867).
238
239
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states. In one case, Hanger v. Abbott, 247 there was a question of
whether the three-year statute of limitations in Arkansas for breach
of contract continued to run during the Civil War. 248 The plaintiffcreditor was a resident of New Hampshire and the defendant-debtor
a resident of Arkansas. 249 The cause of action first accrued on
October 25, 1859, but “all the lawful courts of the State where the
defendant resided were closed by reason of the insurrection and
rebellion[,]” from May 6, 1861 through January 1, 1865. 250 The
Court reasoned the “[a]bility to sue was the status of the creditor
when the contract was made, but the effect of war is to suspend the
right, not only without any fault on his part, but under circumstances
which make it his duty to abstain from any such attempt.”251
Consequently,
it is the loss of the ability to sue that stops the running of the
statute. The inability may arise from a suspension of right, or
from the closing of the courts, but whatever the original cause, the
proximate and operative reason is that the claimant is deprived of
the power to institute his suit. 252

As the Court clarified in Braun v. Sauerwein, where “the
creditor has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any
default of his own . . . the running of a statute of limitation may be
suspended[.]” 253 It is unclear, however, if tolling is only permissible
where the plaintiff first had the right to sue, then lost it, or if tolling
is also allowed where there was not an adequate tribunal to hear the
case even at the time the contract was made; for instance, if the
contract was formed during the era of absolute sovereign immunity.
For the purpose of the below discussion, the author will assume that
tolling is permissible where there was not an ability to sue at the
time the contract was made.

See id.
Id at 533.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 534.
251 Id. at 540.
252 United States v. Wiley, 78 U.S. 508, 513 (1870); see also Compania Maritima v.
United States, 145 F. Supp. 935, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See generally Braun v. Sauerwein,
77 U.S. 218 (1869).
253 Braun, 77 U.S. at 222–23 (emphasis added).
247
248
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a. Absolute Sovereign Immunity
For any injury caused by a sovereign state that occurred prior to
1952, a plaintiff has a strong argument that the statute of limitations
should be tolled up to May 19, 1952, the date that the federal
government adopted the theory of restrictive immunity. 254 If, for
example, a plaintiff held a 45-year 1898 Chinese Imperial bond,
payable in New York, a plaintiff’s claim for defaulted annual
interest coupons at the time of the injury (anywhere between 1899
and 1943) could not be heard in the United States before 1952
because the Chinese government could raise the defense of
sovereign immunity and the U.S. court would dismiss on the theory
of absolute sovereign immunity. 255 Because there was no forum for
the plaintiff to be heard, the statute of limitations on the plaintiff’s
claims would be delayed until an adequate forum is found. 256
b. Tate Letter
With the release of the Tate Letter, this same plaintiff gained the
ability to sue the Chinese government. 257 Consequently, the
plaintiff’s claims expired in 1958, six years after the Tate Letter. 258
As noted during the FSIA Congressional hearings, however, the
Tate Letter, while generally adopting the restrictive immunity
theory, in practice, required courts to receive written notice from the
executive branch detailing whether or not a nation should receive
immunity in a particular case. 259 However, after the Tate Letter,
there were nominally two Chinese governments: the Nationalist
Government in Taipei and the Communist Government in Beijing,
muddies the water. 260 And “[d]uring 1983 the foreign minister of
China presented the Secretary of State with an Aide Memoire stating
that the PRC recognized no obligation to pay external debts incurred
by earlier Chinese governments[.]” 261
As discussed above, the State Department has allowed suit of
Tate Letter, supra note 103.
See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 146–47.
256 See Wiley, 78 U.S. at 513.
257 See Tate Letter, supra note 103.
258 See N.Y. C.L.P.R. 211(a), 213(2) (McKinney 2019).
259 See FSIA Hearings, supra note 115.
260 See Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1952)
(“[The PRC claimants are] representatives of an unrecognized foreign government[.]”).
261 Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1495.
254
255
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unrecognized states such as Iran and Cuba, but there has never been
a situation where the Government allowed suit of an unrecognized
de facto government when it also recognized an official government
which did control territory, but did not have de facto control over
the majority of the country. 262 It is thus unclear whether a
bondholder did in fact have the ability to sue the PRC, or if either
the lack of recognition of the PRC or the arbitrary nature of lawsuits
against sovereigns pre-FSIA would constitute a “superior power.”
c. The FSIA
If the same plaintiff can successfully make the argument that
because neither the U.S. Congress nor the State Department
recognized the PRC, the plaintiff could not have brought suit against
the PRC until the passage of the FSIA in 1976, then the statute of
limitations would be tolled to 1976. 263 For the plaintiff, the vagaries
of State Department sovereign immunity determinations have given
way to objective analyses by the judiciary. 264 Unlike the pre-FSIA
scenario, it is more likely than not that a court would allow a suit
against the PRC once the FSIA was enacted. As discussed above,
the definition of a “foreign state” in the Act is based on international
law, rather than political branch diplomacy. 265 In addition, the
unrecognized PRC meets the criteria to qualify as a foreign state,
for purposes of the FSIA, laid out by the Second Circuit in Morgan
Guaranty: the PRC has the power (1) to declare and wage war; (2)
to conclude peace; (3) to maintain diplomatic ties with other
sovereigns; (4) to acquire territory by discovery and occupation; (5)
to make international agreements and treaties. 266 Further, the PRC
possesses (6) a defined territory and (7) a permanent population (8)
controlled by its own government. 267 Consequently, the plaintiff’s
statute of limitations would run from 1976 and expire in 1981. 268
An attempt to litigate pre-1949 bond claims using the tolling
262 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 408–12; National Petrochemical, 860 F.2d at 553-54
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989).
263 Wiley, 78 U.S. at 513; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611, 1330, 1391(f), 1332,
1441(d).
264 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976).
265 Id. at 14; see also supra Part II.
266 Morgan Guar. Trust, 924 F.2d at 1243.
267 Id.
268 N.Y. C.L.P.R. 211(a), 213(2) (McKinney 2019).
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argument was tried in the Morris case discussed supra. 269 The
bondholder’s tolling argument was unsuccessful in that the court
dismissed the complaint as untimely. 270 The court determined that
the statute of limitations period, “[a]bsent tolling, . . . would be
time-barred six years after payment on each interest coupon could
be demanded.” 271 To survive dismissal, the plaintiff had to “show
that the statute of limitations was continuously tolled from at least
1966 until no more than six years before the present action.” 272
The Morris plaintiff argued that there were several “‘superior
powers’ that precluded suit on the bonds.” 273 These included that
(1) “both World War II and the Communist Revolution in China
prevented courts from hearing this claim”; (2) “the American
government’s prior policy of granting sovereigns absolute
immunity” prevented suit; (3) the “suit could not be bought [sic] in
a federal court while the PRC was a non-recognized government”;
(4) “there was no way to effect service until China became a party
to the Hague Service Convention in 1991”; and (5) the “FSIA was
not retroactive when it was passed and did not become retroactive
until the Supreme Court so found in” Altmann. 274
The court disagreed, concluding that “foreign governments
could be subject to suit since the issuance of the Tate letter in
1952[,]” 275 and that “the FSIA was in fact retroactive from the
moment it became law and allowed suit on this claim no later than
1976.” 276 The court finished its analysis by stating that even “[i]f
plaintiff is correct that no court could entertain his claim against the
PRC until it was recognized by the United States, then he is still
only entitled to tolling into the 1980s.” 277

See supra Section III.B.3.
Morris, 478 F.Supp. 2d at 573.
271 Id. at 571–72.
272 Id. at 572.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 The court failed to consider that other courts would turn away plaintiffs for
retroactive claims prior to the Altmann decision. Ironically, a federal district court in
Alabama did just this in 1986, dismissing a claim by an American holder of a 1911
Imperial Chinese bond against the PRC because the FSIA “did not apply retroactively.”
Morris, 478 F.Supp. 2d at 572 (quoting Jackson, 794 F.2d at 1491).
277 Id. at 573.
269
270
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Pari Passu Obligations
Were a U.S. court to agree with the District Court in Morris, the
same hypothetical plaintiff is left holding a pretty-looking antique
if they failed to sue by 1981. The above analysis, however, was
predicated on the plaintiff claiming an injury of default on the
coupons and principal payments. A recent case in the Second
Circuit, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 278 has
presented the possibility that another type of injury could allow
plaintiffs to pursue claims on these old bonds.
Sovereign bonds commonly contain a pari passu clause: pari
passu is Latin for “by equal step,” and is defined as
“[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference[.]” 279
Generally, the clause acts to ensure that creditors within the same
or similar class of debt are treated equally because “[w]hen
sovereigns default[,] they do not enter bankruptcy proceedings
where the legal rank of debt determines the order in which creditors
will be paid[,] the [pari passu clause] prevents [a sovereign] as
payor from discriminating against [one set of bonds] in favor of
[another].” 280
a. NML Capital v. Argentina
In 2012, the Second Circuit heard NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic
of Argentina. 281 In 1994, Argentina issued bonds in New York,
governed under a Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”). 282 The FAA
contained a pari passu clause, which read:
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured
and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all
times rank pari passu without any preference among themselves.
The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities
shall at all times rank at least equally with all its other present and
future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness[.] 283

278 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 571 U.S. 941 (2013).
279 Pari passu, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
280 NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 259.
281 Id. at 246.
282 Id. at 251.
283 Id. (“‘External Indebtedness’ is limited to obligations payable in non-Argentine
currency.”).
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The plaintiffs held bonds issued under this FAA prior to 2001. 284
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on these bonds, instead offering
new bonds in exchange in 2005 and 2010. 285 The Argentine
government refused to pay any interest or principal on the older
bonds. 286 The plaintiffs sued, arguing that “Argentina’s conduct
violated the [pari passu clause] by both subordinating their [older]
Bonds to the Exchange Bonds and lowering the ranking of their
[older] Bonds below the Exchange Bonds.” 287
The Exchange Bonds included in their prospectus a disclaimer
that any of the older bonds that were not exchanged would “remain
in default indefinitely” because “[t]he Government has announced
that it has no intention of resuming payment on any bonds eligible
to participate in [the] exchange offer[.]” 288 The Argentinean
legislature also passed a law that forbade the Government from
making any “in-court, out-of-court or private settlement with
respect to” the unexchanged bonds (called the “Lock Law”). 289 The
plaintiffs had refused to exchange their old bonds at either the 2005
or 2010 exchange offerings. 290
The Second Circuit interpreted the FAA agreement to provide
bondholders with “protect[ion] against [two] different forms of
discrimination: the issuance of other superior debt and the giving of
priority to other payment obligations.” 291 The court found multiple
ways in which the Argentine government had subordinated the
plaintiffs’ bonds in favor of the Exchange Bonds: (1) “Argentina
made no payments for six years on plaintiffs’ bonds while
simultaneously timely servicing the Exchange Bonds”; (2)
“Argentina . . . renewed [a] moratorium in its budget laws each
See id.
Id.
286 NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251.
287 Id. at 251–52.
288 Id. at 252.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 253.
291 Id. at 259 (“The first sentence (‘[t]he Securities will constitute . . . direct,
unconditional, unsecured, and unsubordinated obligations . . . . ’) prohibits Argentina, as
bond issuer, from formally subordinating the bonds by issuing superior debt. The second
sentence (‘[t]he payment obligations . . . shall at all times rank at least equally with all its
other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.’) prohibits
Argentina, as bond payor, from paying on other bonds without paying on the FAA
bonds.”).
284
285
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year since” 2001 forbidding payment on plaintiffs’ bonds; (3)
prospectuses for new Argentine bonds declared that Argentina “has
no intention of resuming payments on” plaintiffs’ bonds; (4)
Argentina “stated in SEC filings that it had ‘classified the
[plaintiffs’ bonds] as a separate category from its regular debt’ and
is ‘not in a legal position to pay’ them”; and (5) the Argentine
legislature passed the Lock Law forbidding settlement of the
plaintiffs’ bonds, whereas, “were Argentina to default on the
Exchange Bonds, and were the bondholders to obtain New York
judgments against Argentina, there would be no barrier to the
Republic’s courts recognizing those judgments.” 292
The Second Circuit found that Argentina “violated the [pari
passu clause] by persisting in its policy of discriminatory treatment
of plaintiffs, for example, by passing the Lock Law.” 293 The District
Court had “suggested that a breach would occur with any nonpayment that is coupled with payment on other debt[,]” and the
Second Circuit did not overrule that holding. 294 However, when the
Second Circuit heard an appeal from the district court’s updated
injunction order, it clarified that:
Our decision here does not control the interpretation of all pari
passu clauses or the obligations of other sovereign debtors under
pari passu clauses in other debt instruments. As we explicitly
stated in our last opinion, we have not held that a sovereign debtor
breaches its pari passu clause every time it pays one creditor and
not another, or even every time it enacts a law disparately
affecting a creditor’s rights. We simply affirm the district court’s
conclusion that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a
violation of the particular pari passu clause found in the FAA. 295

What is the consequence of this ruling for the hypothetical
plaintiff? Depending on the language of the pari passu clause in
their bond terms, any time the Chinese government pays out to other
bonds, and does not pay on the defaulted bonds, there is a new
injury. 296

NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 260.
Id. at 261.
294 Id. at 264 n.16.
295 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
296 Id. at 264 n.16.
292
293
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Currently, China has at least fourteen outstanding bond series. 297
At least one of these bonds, ISIN code XS1706605281, was set to
pay a coupon on November 2, 2019. 298 If China does pay that
coupon, the injury would result on November 2, 2019, and the
statute of limitations would run for six years after that, expiring in
2025; thus, allowing a plaintiff to bring suit in the next few years.
b. Remedies
In the NML Capital case, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of specific performance: Argentina had to pay its
obligations under the pari passu clause. 299 In addition, “whenever
the Republic pays any amount due under the terms of the
[Exchange] [B]onds, it must concurrently or in advance pay
plaintiffs the same fraction of the amount due to them[.]” 300 The
district court “ordered that copies of the Injunctions be provided to
all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon,
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment on the Exchange
Bonds.” 301 The judge’s order forbade “Argentina’s agents from
aiding and abetting any further violation by [Argentina] of its
obligations [under the pari passu clause], such as any efforts to
make payments under the terms of the Exchange Bonds without also
concurrently or in advance making a ratable payment to
[plaintiffs].” 302
The District Court also prohibited Argentina from changing how
it made payments on the Exchange Bonds to prevent Argentina from
creating an avenue by which it could pay the Exchange Bonds
without paying plaintiffs. 303 These strict measures were justified
because Argentina created a disingenuous and “unprecedented,
systematic scheme of making payments on other external
297 Bond Finder: Issuer – People’s Republic of China, BUS. INSIDER: MARKETS
INSIDER,
https://markets.businessinsider.com/bonds/finder?borrower=4614
[https://perma.cc/BDJ4-ELUA] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
298 China,
Volksrep.
17/27,
BUS.
INSIDER:
MARKETS
INSIDER,
https://markets.businessinsider.com/bonds/china-_peoples_republic_of-bond-2027xs1706605281 [https://perma.cc/K2QJ-4TQ2] (last visited Nov. 9, 2020) (providing
detailed insight into this Chinese bond).
299 NML Capital, 727 F.3d at 254, 265 (internal citations omitted).
300 Id. at 254.
301 Id. at 255.
302 Id.
303 Id.
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indebtedness, after repudiating its payment obligations to
Plaintiffs[.]” 304 The Second Circuit upheld the injunctions. 305
However, it is unclear whether a court would impose these
injunctions on China. Complicating factors include (1) that the debt
was not originally incurred by the government of the PRC and (2)
that China had settled certain claims with the United Kingdom in
1987. 306 A court might look more kindly on a government that did
not voluntarily incur the debt, but it may look unfavorably where
China has paid British bondholders but not bondholders of other
nationalities for historical debt. 307
The same plaintiff may have one last avenue of resort available.
In 1964, the Supreme Court of California heard Coast Bank v.
Minderhout. 308 The plaintiff, Coast Bank, made a series of loans to
Burton and Donald Enright from January 18 to November 12,
1957. 309 The Enrights “executed a promissory note for the full
amount of the indebtedness.” 310 In a separate instrument, the
Enrights “agreed that they would not transfer or encumber without
[Coast Bank’s] consent certain real property owned by them until
all of their indebtedness was paid.” 311 Coast Bank had the right to
“declare all remaining indebtedness due forthwith” if the Enrights
defaulted. 312
In November 1958, still owing Coast Bank, the Enrights
“conveyed the property to defendants without plaintiff’s knowledge
or consent.” 313 Coast Bank proceeded to “accelerate the due date,
but was unable to collect the unpaid balance.” 314 Consequently,
Coast Bank brought suit against the defendants, arguing that the

Id.
NML Capital, 727 F.3d at 265 (internal citations omitted).
306 Agreement concerning the Settlement of Mutual Historical Property Claims,
China-U.K., Jun. 5, 1987, 1656 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter China-U.K. Debt Treaty]; see
also, e.g., 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 37; 5% Gold Loan of 1911, supra note 47.
307 See China-U.K. Debt Treaty, supra note 306, at 79.
308 392 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1964).
309 Id. at 266.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Coast Bank, 392 P.2d at 266.
304
305
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Enright’s instruments created an “equitable mortgage.” 315 As the
court noted:
[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the
contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some
particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or
identified, a security for a debt or other obligation creates an
equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable
against the property in the hands not only of the original
contractor, but of his purchasers or encumbrancers with notice.316

The court stated that “the instrument restricts the rights of the
Enrights in dealing with their property for plaintiff’s benefit[,]” and
thus “afford some indication that the parties intended to create a
security interest” in the property. 317 The court decided that “[t]he
creation of [the security] interest was a . . . lawful object of the
agreement[,]” thus allowing Coast Bank to “foreclose its security
interest” against the defendants. 318
If the hypothetical plaintiff could show that their pre-1949 bond
included a term which granted a security interest over either future
loans of the Chinese government, or over Chinese revenues
generally, then, theoretically, a plaintiff could pursue its security
interest against current bondholders for the payments received from
the Chinese government. 319
V. Concluding Framework
The possibility of successfully navigating a suit to claim
damages on bonds that were issued over a century ago is unlikely.
As such, anyone attempting to do so must learn “a verie formall
art . . . with manie excellent superstitions and ceremonies[.]” 320
A. Jurisdiction
A plaintiff first must overcome the jurisdictional hurdle of the
FSIA. Three requirements must be met: (1) the state a foreign state,
Id.
Id. (quoting 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
1235 (5th ed. 1941)).
317 Id. at 267.
318 Id. at 269.
319 See id.
320 SCOT, supra note 10, at 148 (explaining that one also may need to utter “certeine
words both blasphemous and impious”).
315
316
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(2) the activity a commercial activity, and (3) there is a “direct
effect” in the United States. 321 The first two questions are clearly
met for a claim brought by a holder of pre-1949 Chinese bonds: the
PRC has been adjudged a FSIA foreign state and issuing
government bonds is a commercial activity under the Act. Finding
a “direct effect in the United States” test is more uncertain. 322
Helpful evidence of “direct effects” include: (a) a breach of
contract when performance was validly requested in the United
States; (b) ownership of the bonds by a U.S. citizen at the time of
default; (c) whether the bonds were issued in the United States; (d)
whether the bonds were issued or payable in dollars; (e) whether the
PRC had a designated agent to administer the bonds in the United
States; and (f) whether any negotiations concerning the bond
occurred within the United States. 323
A pre-1949 bond that meets some of these criteria is the
“Imperial Chinese Government 5% Hukuang Railways Sinking
Fund Gold Loan of 1911” from Jackson. 324 This bond provides that
“[a]ll payments of principal and interest on this Bond will be made
in . . . New York in Dollars at the offices of Messrs. J.P. Morgan
and Co., Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., The First National Bank of the
City of New York and the National City Bank of New York[.]” 325
Likewise, a court may find no evidence of “direct effects” if
there is: (a) no evidence of prior American ownership of the bonds;
(b) if plaintiff’s bonds were not issued to American banks; (c) that
there were no designated locations or negotiations in the United
States; and (d) that the bonds were not in U.S. dollars. 326 Morris
concerned a Chinese bond that, because its terms did not allow
redemption in the United States, the court found it did not have a
“direct effect” in the United States. 327
B. Procedural Bars
A defendant-nation would assert that the claims brought against

321
322
323
324
325
326
327

See supra Section II.A.4.
See supra Section III.B.3.
See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71.
Jackson, 550 F. Supp. at 871.
Id.
Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
See id. at 564.
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it from an old bond are untimely. 328 If the plaintiff argues breach of
contract for failure to pay the principal or interest payment, the
defense will win, and the case will be dismissed. 329 Because the
statute of limitations is six years, most old claims expired in the
1940s. 330 Even if the plaintiff can find “superior powers” that
persuade the court to toll the statute of limitations, there were no
barriers to sue the PRC after the passage of the FSIA in 1976. 331
And even if a court believed that the statute should be tolled because
the Supreme Court did not clarify that the FSIA was retroactive until
2004, the statute of limitations expired in 2010. 332
Plaintiffs whose bonds have certain pari passu clauses will be
able to argue that a new injury occurs every time their pari passu
clause is violated. 333 These clauses are violated any time the
sovereign debtor pays creditors who hold subordinate bonds while
refusing to pay the debtor. 334 The substance of this argument will
be discussed in the next section. Nonetheless, the important
procedural point is that the six-year statute begins running from the
date these new injuries occur, and thus, claims arising from
contemporary pari passu injuries are not stale.
C. Substantive Requirements
Breach of contract for default on interest or principal payments
are substantively easy to prove. If the bondholder is the rightful
owner of the bond, and the payments have not been made, the debtor
is in default and owes restitution to the creditor.
But the ‘pari passu injuries’ are more difficult to prove
substantively. 335 Only the NML Capital case provides any guidance
and the Second Circuit purposefully limited the scope of its holding
to Argentina. 336 The two factors the Second Circuit relied upon to
find injury were (1) the clear priority protections granted to
bondholders and (2) the actions of the debtor-nation to avoid paying
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

See supra Section III.C.
See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.C.2.
See supra Section III.B.4.
See supra Section IV.C.3.
See supra Section IV.C.3.a.
See supra Section IV.C.3.
See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 260.
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the debt. 337
The “Chinese Imperial Government Gold Loan of 1898”
includes the following provision: “[t]his entire loan shall have
priority both as regards principal and interest over all future loans,
charges or mortgages so long as this loan or any part thereof shall
be unredeemed.” 338 This broad grant of priority is similar to the
Argentine bonds in NML Capital. 339
Conversely, the
“Reorganisation” bond in Morris provided, in Article IV, that: “The
entire loan . . . shall have priority both as regards to principal and
interest over all future loans, charges and mortgages charged upon
the [“revenues of the Salt Administration of China”] so long as this
loan or any part thereof shall be unredeemed.” 340 The Morris bond
only has priority over bonds that also derive revenues from the Salt
Administration of China, which disintegrated during the Second
World War. 341 Thus, plaintiffs with pari passu clauses reflective of
the “Gold Loan of 1898” have a stronger argument for a ‘pari passu
injury’ than those like the Morris bond.
The plaintiff also has to prove that China is a recalcitrant debtornation, akin to Argentina in NML Capital. Evidence of recalcitrance
includes the PRC’s historic repudiation of Imperial and Nationalist
debt and the disparate treatment of American and British
bondholders by compensating British bondholders while refusing to
pay American bondholders. 342
See id. at 258–59.
E.g., 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note 37.
339 See supra Section IV.C.3.a
340 Bond No. 1913/5, Fr. (Banque de l’Indo-Chine)-Ger. (Deutsch-Asiatische Bank)Gr. Brit. (Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp.)-Japan (Yokohama Specie Bank)-Russ.
(Russo-Asiatic Bank)-China, art. 4, Chinese Government Five per Cent Reorganization
Gold Loan Agreement (with Agreement for Advances, and Annexes) (Apr. 26, 1913),
reprinted in TREATIES 2, supra note 22, at 1008. See 4½% Gold Loan of 1898, supra note
37, at 2, para. 3(b).
341 ARTHUR N. YOUNG, CHINA’S WARTIME FINANCE AND INFLATION, 1937–1945 50–
53 (Harvard Univ. Press 2013) (1965) (explaining that the salt production facilities were
captured by the Japanese early in the war and when the Communists seized power, they
established their own salt monopoly, the China National Salt Industry Corporation); see
China National Salt Industry Corporation (CNSIC), GOVT.CHINADAILY.COM.CN,
http://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/201904/22/WS5cbd8917498e079e6801eb5b/chinanational-salt-industry-corporation-cnsic.html
[https://perma.cc/4BSS-ZWWJ]
(last
updated Apr. 22, 2019).
342 See China, Britain Settle Claims, supra note 70; H.R. Con. Res. 160, 110th Cong.
(2007) (recommending that the PRC be denied access to U.S. capital markets until it
complies with the WTO Agreement terms and conditions and honors its outstanding
337
338
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D. Remedy
This paper has not discussed the difficulty of enforcing
judgements on foreign sovereigns. Other writers have addressed
this. 343 In brief, “[i]t is easier to obtain a judgment against a foreign
state than to execute that judgment.” 344
But a plaintiff who can bring a ‘pari passu injury’ like in NML
Capital may be able to seize revenues paid to other bonds from the
same issuer. Coast Bank allowed the creditor to seize property from
a third party because the lending contract to the debtor created an
‘equitable mortgage.’ 345 If a bond contains contractual language
which allows subordination of future bonds or first liens on a
country’s revenue, then the bondholder could pursue payments
made to a bondholder with a subordinate bond. The Morris bond
discussed above, by its terms, only allows priority over revenues
from the Salt Administration of China, and because no payments
are being made from this revenue stream, a plaintiff holding such
bonds would be unsuccessful bringing a claim for violating the pari
passu clause. 346 Contrasting the bond in Morris with the “Gold
Loan of 1898,” the Gold Loan creates priority over all future
obligations of any kind, regardless of security or revenue stream,
and, thus, present a bondholder with a higher likelihood of success
bringing a claim under the pari passu clause.
VI. Conclusion
A pre-1949 bondholder can be forgiven for feeling as though the
law in this field is like the fruit tree and pool of water in Tartarus,
which taunts the thirsty without ever delivering refreshment. 347
Very few factual situations exist that justify a court finding “direct
effects” in the United States and suspending the passage of time by,
for example, a perpetual broad-reaching pari passu clause. This is
perhaps an intentional manifestation of an ameliorative policy for
rehabilitated creditors. As idiosyncratic as the law may seem in this
defaulted public debts owed to U.S. citizens).
343 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 75–78 (2001).
344 Id. at 75.
345 See Coast Bank, 392 P.2d at 265.
346 See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 572 n.16.
347 See PSEUDO-APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY (James G. Frazer trans., Harvard Univ.
Press 1921).
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area, the results are roughly fair. The beneficial flows of
development capital in the present at some point should no longer
be arrested by the unfinished business of prior generations.
Accordingly, those desiring a return on their objet d’art through the
courts perhaps are better advised instead to find an executive branch
solution, perhaps a bellicose administration that demands
reparations in return for trade concessions. In China’s history, this
sounds familiar.
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